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BOOK REVIEWS

THE IMPORTANCE OF SEA POWER
Holmes, James R., and Toshi Yoshihara. Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan.
New York: Routledge, 2008. 167pp. $140

Although China’s sudden quest to
dominate its littoral waters with an ever
expanding fleet and deliberately innovative weapons continues to be well
publicized, the theoretical impetus for
this radical reorientation remains
murky. As their book’s subtitle indicates, Holmes and Yoshihara attribute
the major thrust to the conscious study
and explicit adoption (and adaptation)
of Mahan’s apparently timeless discussion on the essential nature of sea
power.
In eight concise but informative chapters based upon extensive research using primary sources, Chinese Naval
Strategy examines how this intensifying,
sea-oriented aggressiveness and underlying strategic vision have managed to
evolve over the past decade within the
persistent countercurrent of such heritage concepts as Mao’s land-based “aggressive defense”; reprises current
analyses in the light of Mahan’s assertions on the necessity of commanding
the commons and his historical analysis
of the American situation; describes Liu
Huaqing’s formative influence in shifting the direction and concept of naval
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affairs; dissects recent evaluations, taking exception to those that dismiss the
naval abilities of the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) as outmoded; and examines efforts to overcome operational
constraints imposed by the extended
“first island chain.” The perceived
threats posed by the contiguous powers
of Japan and South Korea are also
noted, and the danger of possible confrontation with American “hegemonic”
power is summarily explored before the
book is brought to an end with an incisive overview of possibilities and
projections.
Holmes and Yoshihara deliberately focus upon littoral waters, resulting in a
sustained examination of the relevant
strategic issues that necessarily excludes
any contemplation of potential PRC
clashes with Southeast Asian countries
or India (with whom the PRC is already
embroiled in an arms race despite a
conspicuous “charm offensive”). They
succinctly analyze the Taiwan question
in terms of the island’s strategic significance as an intolerable constraint when
exploited by enemy forces but a formidable bastion for future PRC power
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projection. Moreover, while avoiding
the entanglements of hard force specifications, they note the growing arsenal
of land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles that
might be employed in an integrated
sea-denial effort, with possibly dire
consequences.
Before receiving his PhD in international law and diplomacy, James
Holmes had a lengthy career as a naval
engineering officer, studied at the Naval
War College, and pursued crucial oceanic issues. Toshi Yoshihara, who has
competence in both Chinese and Japanese, has focused on Chinese strategic
questions since earning his doctorate
from the Fletcher School. Amid the
highly balkanized world of contemporary Chinese security studies, the ongoing dialogue of these two Naval War
College professors has produced a perceptive, balanced analysis that remains
sensitive to operational constraints and
escapes the narrow perspective often
characterizing works by single authors.
Apart from issues explicitly raised, the
book prompts numerous questions for
contemplation. For example, what are the
implications of “command of the commons” in peacetime? (Can the PRC exclude other nations from its littoral waters
simply by threat and coercion, thereby
achieving Sunzi’s ideal, or will assertions
of localized superiority inevitably spawn
conflict?) How will Mahan’s thrust be realized in the South China Sea, through
land bases or vulnerable naval assets?
Thus, despite the lamentable lack of maps
and inevitable source constraints, Chinese
Naval Strategy should be deemed critical
reading for anyone concerned with PRC
strategy and intentions.
RALPH D. SAWYER

Centre for Military and Strategic Studies
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Erickson, Andrew S., Lyle J. Goldstein, William
S. Murray, and Andrew R. Wilson, eds. China’s
Future Nuclear Submarine Force. Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2007. 412pp. $45

From the title, readers might expect this
book to focus solely and closely on the
People’s Republic of China’s aspirations
to develop nuclear submarines as a
means to enhance the reach of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
However, the seventeen chapters in this
volume range well beyond submarines,
considering more broadly what may be
inferred from evolving naval capacities
about the PRC’s grand strategic objectives. Contributors to this book sift evidence—much of it from Chinese
sources—for insight about what, specifically, Beijing is developing the capacity
to do and what it is likely to do with it.
Therefore, this work is likely to appeal
not only to the submarine enthusiast
but to any reader who is curious about
the role of naval development in the
PRC’s quest to expand its military
power.
The book, an outgrowth of a conference
sponsored in 2005 by the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval
War College, features contributions by
some of America’s most prominent
(and promising ) analysts of PRC naval
affairs. It offers readers an incomparably thorough view from open sources of
an emerging phenomenon and of the
debate among analysts about the significance of this development. As with
many edited volumes, this book offers
in variety and breadth of topics what it
may lack in cohesion and focus. Yet it
does provide persuasive evidence that
the PLAN is substantially expanding its
submarine force—apparently making
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